Climate Colonialisms
This project is still at a very early stage of development. The plan, however, is to examine three climate-fueled problems (see below), which threaten to cement an emerging, extractivist neo-colonial order. At every step, analysis of these problems will be paired with an exploration of the democratic movements needed to confront them.
1. Land and water grabbing
Affluent, food-importing nations have begun purchasing or leasing huge tracts of arable land and freshwater rights—often in countries that have high domestic rates of food insecurity and hunger. For instance, by 2009, China had purchased rights to nearly 2.8 million hectares (or 6.9 million acres) of arable land in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Yet, from 1998 to 2007, an estimated 5.4 million DRC citizens died mostly through starvation (as conflict severely disrupted agriculture), and to this day the country relies heavily on food aid. Unsurprisingly, the DRC tops the “Fragile State Index” (which measures political instability), and has a poverty rate of nearly 64%.
China is not the only country participating in what some are calling “land-” and “water-grabbing.” Many states—including Saudi Arabia, the U.S., the U.K., Qatar, the U.A.E., South Korea, Kuwait, India, Egypt, Japan, Jordan, and others—and even private corporations are appropriating land and water in Ethiopia, Sudan, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brazil, Angola, Congo, Zambia, Myanmar, and Mozambique, among other places. By and large, the purchasers are affluent states dependent on food imports, while many of the host countries are, like the DRC, politically unstable, relatively poor, and, ironically, dependent on U.N. food lifelines.
Among the many concerns land- and water-grabbing raises, chief is the potential for neo-colonial assertions of power and conflict. In some places already, security forces have been introduced to protect land purchases from displaced farmers and hungry citizens. As climate shocks constrain supply, this dynamic will almost certainly become more aggressive. At what point will export zones simply become “fortified colonies?” When will states think it appropriate to assert, through military might, their “right” to the resources they purchased or leased? When will these states simply topple the already weak regimes whose resources they depend upon and install new powers, more amenable to an extractive, colonial relationship? The urgency of answering these questions become clear when we consider that virtually every powerful country on earth—including every permanent member of the U.N. Security Council—now possesses land or water rights in developing countries.
China is not the only country participating in what some are calling “land-” and “water-grabbing.” Many states—including Saudi Arabia, the U.S., the U.K., Qatar, the U.A.E., South Korea, Kuwait, India, Egypt, Japan, Jordan, and others—and even private corporations are appropriating land and water in Ethiopia, Sudan, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brazil, Angola, Congo, Zambia, Myanmar, and Mozambique, among other places. By and large, the purchasers are affluent states dependent on food imports, while many of the host countries are, like the DRC, politically unstable, relatively poor, and, ironically, dependent on U.N. food lifelines.
Among the many concerns land- and water-grabbing raises, chief is the potential for neo-colonial assertions of power and conflict. In some places already, security forces have been introduced to protect land purchases from displaced farmers and hungry citizens. As climate shocks constrain supply, this dynamic will almost certainly become more aggressive. At what point will export zones simply become “fortified colonies?” When will states think it appropriate to assert, through military might, their “right” to the resources they purchased or leased? When will these states simply topple the already weak regimes whose resources they depend upon and install new powers, more amenable to an extractive, colonial relationship? The urgency of answering these questions become clear when we consider that virtually every powerful country on earth—including every permanent member of the U.N. Security Council—now possesses land or water rights in developing countries.
2. Rising seas and territory loss
The second chapter examines the problem of climate-induced territory loss. As nations like Kiribati and the Marshall Islands begin to disappear into the sea, they are being forced to buy land and relocate citizens in host countries, critically endangering their sovereignty as well as their ability to preserve cultural traditions.
3. Geo-engineering and dependency
The third chapter builds on the work of scholars like Stephen Gardiner and Megan Bloom in exploring the potential of geo-engineering to make the poorest and most vulnerable states dependent for their survival on wealthy nations, which alone possess the resources to deploy potentially necessary large-scale interventions.